Internacional

Un Parlamento y ningún Faraón

12 Jul, 2013 - - @kanciller

En este mismo foro he hablado en otras ocasiones sobre el clásico debate entre el sistema presidencial y parlamentario. El otro día, tras el golpe de estado que derrocó a Mursi, recordaba este artículo de Alfred Stepan y Juan Linz de febrero de 2011 en el recomendaban vivamente que el Egipto post Mubarak adoptase un sistema parlamentario. En cierta medida, algunas de sus palabras fueron visionarias.

To elect a president is to commit to one person, generally for at least four years. But, because the country’s political parties are so young, so numerous, and so inexperienced, it is very uncertain that any person elected today in Egypt would have the same support in even a year. For example, if there are many candidates in a first round of a presidential election, it is conceivable that neither of the two candidates in the second-round run-off will have won more than 20% in the first round. The winner would thus assume all the burdens of leadership with the support of only a small minority of the electorate.

It is also possible that a new president turns out to be incompetent, or is in a permanent minority position and unable to pass legislation. In this way, many new democracies fall rapidly into «super-presidentialism» with plebiscitary qualities.

Hace apenas un par de días Bruce Ackerman volvió a la carga con argumentos similares en el NYT:

Only a parliamentary system provides a realistic path to a more stable, inclusive future. Even if Islamist parties won a substantial share of the vote, they would not be able to monopolize power. (…)

Parliamentary government is no cure-all, but a good design can remedy the most serious pathologies. Some systems, like the Italian, require a government to fall whenever a majority of representatives votes “no confidence” — leading to notorious episodes of instability. Others, like the German system, keep the old government in power until the new majority can actually agree on a replacement. That is by far the better approach for Egypt. While momentary majorities may say no to government initiatives, they should show that they have the sustained support of Parliament as a body before they can establish themselves in power.

Egypt’s future will depend on the statesmanship of its leaders and the effectiveness of its policies. But a decisive move in the direction of a well-designed parliamentary democracy would create a constitutional order that encourages democrats of all persuasions to reach out to one another.

Esta vez se argumenta a favor sistema parlamentario como una posible vía para dar una salida democrática a Egipto tras el golpe de Estado. A mi juicio tras un proceso de transición existe cierta dependencia histórica en el diseño institucional que no siempre hace fácil salir de una senda presidencial. No creo que desmontar el aparato del régimen anterior sea algo tan sencillo y ninguno de los artículos afronta esas dificultades. Sin embargo, estos textos sí que son útiles como elementos de debate y para pensar en qué medida el diseño institucional podría marcar la diferencia.